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Introduction
Domestic consumption of explosives during 2003 was
approximately 5.05 billion pounds and about 89% (4.5
billion pounds) was used by the mining industry [USGS,
2004].  Blasting is a great tool in fragmenting and loos-
ening rock and other materials for easier handling and
removal by mining equipment.  However, blasting cre-
ates serious concerns for the mine operators and miners
in terms of blast area security.   
One thousand one hundred and thirty-one blasting-
related injuries were reported by the mining industry
during the period 1978-2003 [Verakis & Lobb, 2003 with
updated data].  Blast area security accounted for 50.1% of
these injuries followed by premature blast (11.4%), fly-
rock (10.8%), misfires (9.9%), and fumes (8.5%).  Figure
1 shows the distribution of blasting-related injuries dur-
ing 1978-2003. 
During 1978-2003, blast area security accounted for
41% of all blasting related injuries reported by surface
mines.  The corresponding figure for underground mines
was 56%.  The data indicates that injuries from inade-
quate blast area security are more prevalent in under-
ground blasting.
Verakis & Lobb [2003 with updated data] analyzed
more recent data (1994-2003) to assess any changes in
the role of blast area security.  During this period, blast
area security accounted for nearly 41.6% of all blasting-
related injuries in surface and underground mines.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of blasting-related
injuries during 1994-2003.  Injuries due to inadequate
blast area security continue to be a major safety concern. 
The injuries discussed in this article, primarily result
from failure to identify and clear the blast area, inade-
quate guarding, failure to communicate or follow instruc-
This article examines the factors related to
injuries due to inadequate blasting shelters
and blast area security, and identifies miti-
gation techniques.  The key concepts are:
(a) accurate determination of the bounds
of the blast area, (b) clearing employees
from the blast area, (c) effective access
control, (d) use of adequate blasting shel-
ters, (e) efficient communications, and (f)
training.  Fundamentals are reviewed with
an emphasis on analyzing task elements
and identifying root causes for selected
blasting accidents. Mitigating techniques
are presented along with discussions and
examples.
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tions, and inadequate or improper cover.  Compliance
to an effective blast area security protocol plays a key
role in preventing injuries to miners, visitors, neighbors,
and trespassers. 
Blast Area
One of the greatest challenges, which a blaster faces
in mining and construction blasting, is to accurately
determine the bounds of the blast area.  This is partic-
ularly true in geologically disturbed rock.  A blaster’s
decision in estimating the bounds of the blast area is
greatly influenced by the engineering design of the
blast, geology of the blast, regulatory requirements, and
company policy.  Schneider [1995] stated that a blaster
must make an estimate of the maximum possible dis-
tance flyrock could travel from a shot.  Furthermore, a
blaster should not assume that a shot being fired will
behave like other shots previously fired at the same
operation.  
For surface and underground metal-nonmetal mines,
Title 30 Code of Federal Regulations (30 CFR) § 56.2 and
§ 57.2 defines blast area as the area near blasting oper-
ations in which concussion or flying material may cause
injury.  The following factors shall be considered to
determine the blast area:
• Geology or material to be blasted,
• Blast pattern,
• Burden, depth, diameter, and angle of the holes,
• Blasting experience of the mine,
• Delay systems, powder factor, and pounds per
delay,
• Type and amount of explosive material, and
• Type and amount of stemming.
The Federal Office of Surface Mining (OSM) regula-
tions [30 CFR § 816.67 and 817.67] help to characterize
the bounds of the blast area by specifying that flyrock
shall not be cast from the blasting site-
• More than one-half the distance to the nearest
dwelling or other occupied structure,
• Beyond the area of control required under 30 CFR §
816.66(c), or
• Beyond the permit boundary.
Similar requirements are prescribed by many coal
mining states such as Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, New
Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.  
The bounds of a blast area should be adequately
determined for each blast.  Flyrock could travel beyond
an inadequately defined blast area and cause injury.  In
Campbell County, TN, flyrock traveled beyond the blast
area resulting in a fatal injury to a motorist traveling on
interstate 75 [Shea & Clark, 1998].  The bounds of the
blast area were not adequately determined for this blast.
In a coal mine blast, flyrock traveled 900 feet and land-
ed beyond the permit boundary causing a fatal injury
[MSHA, 1990a].  During a construction blasting operation
near Marlboro, NY, flyrock was showered on passing
motorists on Route 9 W about 180 feet from the blast pit.
This incident resulted in property damage and injury.
There are numerous instances where the bounds of the
blast area were not accurately determined, resulting in
injury, or property damage. There are many cases of
close calls where accidents were narrowly missed.  
Blast area security in underground mines is much
more complex than surface blasting.  It requires a thor-
ough understanding of ventilation, roof characteristics,
and the roof control plan of the mine.  The bounds of
the blast area need to be adjusted accordingly.  Blasting
could cause ground fall in adjacent entries, and exposure
to smoke, dust, or toxic fumes.  All employees must be
removed from such adjacent entries or other affected air-
ways.  Post-blast roof fall and exposure to fumes have
caused several accidents.
Fundamental task-elements of a blast area
security system 
A blast area security system is the means by which a
mine operator prevents injury to people or damage to
equipment when a scheduled blast is detonated [Fletcher
Figure 1.Distribution of blasting-related injuries in the mining industry.
& D’Andrea, 1987].  Most blasting accidents in surface
and underground mines occur during scheduled blasting
and are due to inadequate blast area security.  MSHA
accident data reveal that the blasting crew and blasters
often suffer serious injuries due to inadequacy of the
shelter used for protection from blasts.
The functional task-elements of a blast area security
system are (a) estimate the flyrock zone based on shot
conditions, and add a factor of safety to determine the
bounds of the blast area, (b) clear all employees, con-
tractors, and visitors from the blast area, (c) post guards
at the access points to prevent unauthorized entry, (d)
use adequate blasting shelters for employees whose
presence is required in the blast area, and (e) maintain
effective communication with guards, mine foreman,
and other employees.
Determination of the bounds of the blast
area
Correct assessment of the bounds of the blast area is
the first step in ensuring safety.  The blaster should
determine the bounds of the blast area after careful
consideration of information such as the driller’s
log, blasthole deviation data, laser-profile data,
slant of the holes, blasthole loading data, con-
dition of the highwall, presence of over-
hangs, back-breaks, voids, weathering,
and variations in the local geology.  A
blaster usually understands that in a
given surface or underground mine,
blast area could vary from shot to shot.
There are many occurrences of flyrock land-
ing beyond the property or permit boundary in
surface blasting.  Such occurrences demonstrate
incorrect determination of the bounds of the blast
area.  Flyrock from a limestone quarry traveled about
930 ft and fatally injured a resident who was mowing
grass on his property [MSHA 1990b].  
In underground mining situations, the mine roof con-
ditions, ground support system, and ventilation are
important factors in determining the extent of the blast
area.  In an underground gold mining operation in
Nevada, blasting in a drift caused a roof fall in another
drift situated about 25 ft below the blasted drift.  When
the blast occurred in the upper drift, about 40 to 50 tons
of material above the anchorage zone, supported by 6-
ft roof bolts, fell as a result of the blast.
Blasting often causes redistribution of stress in pillars
and roof area.  The blast area should be extended
beyond any suspected zones of weakness in roof strata.
Often, blasting has caused roof falls in metal/nonmetal
mines particularly in weak roofs.  The blast area should
be extended to mitigate such hazards.  Roof and rib con-
ditions need to be checked before any employee is
allowed to enter the area.   
Determining the bounds of a blast in an underground
coal mine is an especially important task.  Serious
injuries and fatalities have occurred when a blast shoots
through into an adjacent entry.  In an underground coal
mine in Floyd County, KY, three miners were injured
when a face blasted into an outby crosscut [MSHA,
2003].  
Removing employees from the blast area 
All employees must be cleared from the blast area
and removed to a safe location prior to any scheduled
blasting.  All equipment in the blast area should be
removed or protected from flyrock damage, if possible.
An accounting must be made for all employees to make
sure that no one is left behind in the blast area.
Arrangements should be made to ensure that no one can
return back to the blast area prior to sounding an “all-
clear” signal.  Several accidents were caused because a
blaster or a crew member was within the bounds of the
blast area when the shot was fired.  In a limestone mine,
a blaster and a crane operator were standing on a top
bench about 120 feet from the nearest blasthole.  Upon
firing the shot, the crane operator was fatally injured by
flyrock [MSHA, 1994].  In a nonmetal mine, a visitor sus-
tained serious injuries and a blaster-helper was fatally
injured by flyrock [MSHA, 1990c].  They were within 150
feet from the edge of the blast.  
In many underground mines, blasting is sched-
uled during a non-production shift when no one,
except the blast crew, is present underground.
In addition to mitigating blasting hazards, this
procedure aids in providing additional
time for clearing dust, smoke, and
fumes from the underground work-
ings.  
For surface coal mines, 30 CFR §
77.1303 (h) requires that “All persons shall
be cleared and removed from the blasting area
unless suitable blasting shelters are provided to
protect men endangered by concussion or flyrock
from blasting.”  For underground coal mines, 30 CFR §
75.1325 (c) requires that “All persons shall leave the
blasting area and each immediately adjacent working
place where a hazard would be created by the blast, to
an area that is around at least one corner from the blast-
ing area. The qualified person shall ascertain that all per-
sons are a safe distance from the blasting area.”   The
onus of determining the safe distance rests on the qual-
ified person, who in most cases is the blaster.
In brief, the message is “Be alert and share infor-
mation; know the blasting time, blast area and
clearing procedure; and do not enter the blast area
until an “all-clear” signal is sounded.” 
Access control
To prevent unauthorized entry, guards should be
posted at all access points leading to the blast area.
Guards should physically remain at their duty stations
until an “all-clear” signal is sounded.  The guards must
be attentive at all times to ensure the security of the
blast.  Additionally, barricades may be erected with signs
in bold letters such as “Warning! Explosives in Use,
Blasting Area, Do Not Enter” may be posted at all
access points.  





30 CFR § 56.6306 (e) (3) and 57.6306(e) (3) require that
“All access routes to the blast area shall be guarded or
barricaded to prevent the passage of persons or vehi-
cles.”  30 CFR § 56.6306 (a) and 57.6306(a) require that
“When explosive materials or initiating systems are
brought to the blast site, the blast site shall be attended;
barricaded and posted with warning signs, such as
“Danger,” “Explosives,” or “Keep Out;” or flagged
against unauthorized entry.”
The OSM regulations in 30 CFR § 816.66 (c) and
817.66 (c) require that “Access within the blast area shall
be controlled to prevent presence of livestock or unau-
thorized persons during blasting and until an authorized
representative of the operator has reasonably deter-
mined that - (a) No unusual hazards, such as imminent
slides or undetonated charges, exist; and (b) Access to
and travel within the blasting area can be safely
resumed.”
Several accidents were related to inadequate access-
control to the blast area.  A neighbor was fatally injured
when he inadvertently entered the blast area through an
access trail before the blast [MSHA, 1999].  Guards were
not posted for access control.  The access trail was in a
wooded area and not visible from the firing station.  This
incident underscores the need for an effective access
control protocol.   
In a coal mine incident, a guard was posted to pre-
vent entry to an access road leading to the blast area.
Immediately before the blast, the guard left his post and
went to the mine office for a brief visit.  No barricade or
notice of impending blasting was posted at this access
road.  In the meantime, a drill operator and a dozer
operator, unaware of the impending blasting, entered
the pit area in a pickup truck.  Upon firing the shot, the
dozer operator was fatally injured and the drill operator
sustained injuries [MSHA, 1989a].  This accident could
have been prevented by proper access control. 
In another coal mine, a fatal accident occurred
because an employee, who was cleared from the blast
area, managed to return to the coal bench a few minutes
before the scheduled blast.  No one including the blaster
noticed the employee returning to the coal bench.  The
victim was about 15 feet from the toe of a 43-feet high-
wall.  Upon firing the overburden shot, the employee
and his pickup truck were covered under a pile of blast-
ed material [MSHA, 1989b].  It is important to make cer-
tain that no one can return back to the blast area until
an “all-clear” signal is sounded.  
Bennett’s [1981] study indicated that access control
and blast guarding suffer from poor procedures rather
than from a lack of advanced technology.  Management
and employees should diligently strive to formulate and
follow best site-specific procedures and policies to pre-
vent injuries.  A good access control procedure, upon
implementation, can prevent injuries from blasting. 
Blasting shelter
MSHA accident data indicate that blasters and helpers
often suffer injuries due to lack of adequate shelter from
a blast.  The blaster and blasting crew are typically clos-
er to a blast than other employees and need to use shel-
ter that will provide complete protection from flyrock that
may be projected from a blast.  Flyrock from a blast can
travel vertically and does not fall like gentle rain.  Flyrock
can also travel along a horizontal path and become a
deadly projectile.  
Unfortunately, there are too many instances that illus-
trate the use of inadequate protection from flyrock that
was generated by a blast.  For example, a blaster fired a
charge inside a water well hole.  A piece of flyrock trav-
eled 208 feet and fatally struck the blaster on the head.
The blaster was standing in the open and did not use
some means of protection such as a blasting shelter.
In another incident in Pulaski County, KY, a blaster
having sixteen years experience, took shelter behind a
metal magazine of approximate size 4-feet high by 4-feet
wide by 4-feet long and fired a charge.  A piece of flyrock
weighing about 15 pounds traveled 150 feet and fatally
struck the blaster on the head [Schneider, 1995].  This
accident could have been prevented by using an ade-
quate blasting shelter.  
Figure 2 shows a blasting shelter used at a surface
limestone mine in Southwestern USA.  The shelter was
constructed by the mine’s personnel.  Another example
of a blasting shelter used at a surface limestone mine in
Ohio is shown in Figure 3. The mining company
requires that this type of blasting shelter be used for pro-
tection from a blast.  The blast shelter is mounted on
skids for ease of transportation and is constructed of steel
that is 3/8-inch thick.  The use of specially designed blast-
ing shelters can provide the protection needed to prevent
a person from being struck by flyrock.  In the interna-
tional sphere, a more sophisticated blast shelter has been
designed by two Queensland, Australian inventors
[Queensland Government Mining Journal, May 2001].
The shelter, which is cylindrical and constructed of 5/8-
inch thick steel, is mounted on a rubber tired trailer.  
Figure 2.Blasting shelter used at a surface limestone mine in
southwestern United States.
Figure 3.Blasting shelter at a surface limestone mine in Ohio.
Light buildings, pickup trucks, and other vehicles
which are often used as covers, have been penetrated by
flyrock [Schneider, 1996].  During a coal mine blast, a
blaster positioned himself under a Ford 9000, 21/2-ton
truck, and fired the shot.  A piece of flyrock traveled
about 750 ft and fatally injured the blaster under the
truck [MSHA, 1992].  This accident could have been pre-
vented by using an adequate blasting shelter.  A safe
location and sufficient cover is critical to a blaster’s pro-
tection if the firing lines are not long enough to be
beyond the flyrock range [Schneider, 1996].  Some blast-
ing operations use a remote controlled firing system to
permit blasters to stay out of the blast area.
In a construction blast, an employee standing behind
a front-end loader was struck by flyrock.  The employee
suffered trauma to his neck and lacerations to his face
[OSHA, 1992]. This accident could have been prevented
by using an adequate blasting shelter. 
The Chief Inspector of Mines in Queensland,
Australia, reported that a blaster was standing behind a
steel hopper while video-taping a toe shot in a metallif-
erous quarry.  Flyrock traveled about 246 feet and seri-
ously injured the blaster.  The blaster lost his right eye,
his cheek bone was shattered, and his jaw was broken.
This accident could have been prevented by using a
proper blasting shelter.  
Effective communication
Effective communication is a key element in prevent-
ing blasting injuries.  Blasting in mining operations is a
complex process and requires coordination and com-
munication between (a) driller and blaster, (b) blaster
and crew members, (c) blaster and other miners, and (d)
blaster and mine management, among others.  Failure of
effective communication may result in fatalities and seri-
ous injuries.  Workers and visitors should be informed
about the blasting signals, evacuation procedure, loca-
tion, and timing of a scheduled blast on a daily basis.
Many surface operations schedule blasting events
between sunrise and sunset.  In many underground
operations, blasting is often scheduled when no one,
except the blast crew, is present in the vicinity.  
Audible signals, such as sirens, whistles, or horns
mounted on a vehicle, are used in many operations to
caution employees, visitors, and neighbors about a
scheduled blasting event.  Enough time should be pro-
vided to facilitate orderly evacuation of all personnel,
whose presence is not required, from the blast area.  
For surface and underground metal-nonmetal mines,
30 CFR § 56.6306 (f) (1) and 57.6306 (f) (1) require that
“Ample warning shall be given to allow all persons to be
evacuated.”  For surface coal mines, 30 CFR § 77.1303
requires that “ample warning shall be given before blasts
are fired.”  The OSM regulation in 30 CFR 816.64 (a)
requires that “The operator shall publish the blasting
schedule in a newspaper of the general circulation in the
locality of the blasting site at least 10 days, but not more
than 30 days, before beginning of a blasting program.”
30CFR 817.64 (a) requires that “The operator shall noti-
fy, in writing, residents within 1/2 mile of the blasting
site and local governments of the proposed times and
locations of blasting operations.”  
Unified approach for mitigating injuries 
Brnich & Mallett [2003] advanced the concept of con-
ducting a hazard-risk assessment for preventing mining
injuries.  A site-specific hazard-risk assessment based on
the probability of an event and its severity is an excellent
tool for the blasting community.  Blasting releases a
tremendous amount of energy within a very short time
and is considered a hazardous operation.  An analysis of
site-specific risk factors will help in understanding and
mitigating possible hazards.  A site-specific hazard-risk
matrix should be drawn up and discussed during
blaster/miners job assignments, safety discussions, and
training sessions.  
An Australian document [DR 04062, 2004] issued for
public comment accentuates the risks of blasting and
recommends that “...whenever explosives are to be used
that a competent person(s) carry out a detailed risk
assessment to identify all foreseeable potential hazards
and take appropriate steps to eliminate or reduce the
likelihood and mitigate the severity of any effects so that
risks are at an acceptable level.”  The Australian docu-
ment accentuates Brnich & Mellett’s [2003] hazard-risk
assessment concept.
Brulia [1993] reported that about 80-90% of all acci-
dents are caused by human factors, and listed five salient
elements which contributed to these accidents:
• Negligence - failure to observe safety rules and
instructions,
• Hasty decisions - acting before thinking usually lead-
ing to hazardous shortcuts,
• Inadequate instruction - untrained or improperly
trained personal,
• Overconfidence - taking chances, 
• Lack of planning - insufficient understanding of a
blasting situation.
Safety professionals often use a multi-faceted
approach for injury prevention. This includes interven-
tion techniques conducted through (a) training and con-
tinuing education of miners and blasters, (b) site-specif-
ic policies and procedures, and (c) engineering controls.
Commitment to safety by the blaster, blasting crew, other
miners, and the mine operator is the most essential
ingredient for injury prevention.  
Training and continuing education
Training and continuing education play a vital role in
building up and enhancing the knowledge base of
employees.  It helps the blaster, blasting crew, and other
miners to develop a higher level of awareness to identi-
fy hazards and apply proper mitigating techniques.  Site-
specific training relative to the bounds of the blast area,
non-work zone beyond the blast area, blast guarding,
access control, and clearing protocol should be made
available to all new employees.  A detailed discussion of
hazards associated with the transport and use of explo-
sives should also be included in the overall training pro-
gram.  Drillers should be trained to search for any geo-
logical anomaly and report such information to the
blaster.  Blasters should be trained to consider all avail-
able data to determine the bounds of the blast area for
each shot.  The level of training, experience, and attitude
of explosive handlers is crucial to the attainment of high-
er blasting safety [Brulia, 1993].
The ISEE has made available several state-of-the-art
training modules for mining and construction blasting.
The MSHA’s National Mine Health and Safety Academy
also provides training and material for surface and
underground blasting.  Regular refresher training should
be made available to all explosive handlers.  OSM and
many state regulations require that blasters working in
surface coal mines be examined and certified.  
It is important to conduct a post-blast analysis of each
shot to determine if the shot performed as planned.
And, if there are any deviations, the blaster should look
for the reasons for such deviations.  All near miss inci-
dents should be critically examined.  Training should be
aimed at greatly augmenting the blaster’s knowledge
and confidence level.  The blaster should be proactive
and understand that “The challenge is defined, the solu-
tion is clear, the need is immediate, and success depends
on the blaster.”
Site specific policies and procedures
Mine operators should develop site-specific safety
procedures consistent with company policy, local, state
and federal laws.  The procedure should address all
activities such as equipment selection, blast planning,
determining the location of blastholes, pre-blast exami-
nation of face and high wall, evaluation of driller’s log,
loading and priming of explosive charge, determining
the bounds of the blast area and non-work zone beyond
the blast area, evacuation and clearing protocol of
employees, personnel accounting system, examination
and guarding blast area, blasting time and signal, access
control to blast area, and communication protocol.  
Many mine operators have standardized their blast
guarding protocol.  Pre-blast planning and discussion
with crew members reinforce confidence and provide an
avenue for good cooperation.  Such discussion and plan-
ning forums also provide an opportunity to ask ques-
tions and resolve any doubts or misconceptions.
As a matter of policy, many underground mines
schedule a blasting event for the evening or night shift
when no one, except the blasting crew, is present under-
ground.  Some operators have installed a remote firing
system to remove the blaster from the blast area.  
Engineering controls
Blasting safety can be greatly enhanced by good engi-
neering controls and feedback mechanisms.  Engineering
controls should be well understood and closely followed
by the blasting community.  Dick et al. [1983] and
Fletcher & D’Andrea [1986] advocated the use of portable
blasting shelters.  The shelter may be cylindrical in shape
and constructed of heavy steel to withstand any possible
impact from flyrock. The portable shelter may be mount-
ed on wheels or skids for ease of moving from one blast
area to another.  The blaster enters the shelter and clos-
es the door prior to firing the shot.
Commitment to safe blasting practices by the mine
operator, blaster-in-charge, blasting and drilling crew and
other miners and affected persons is an essential ingre-
dient in injury prevention.  Many mines have developed
excellent site-specific blast guarding systems.  An indi-
vidual, with experience and knowledge in blasting,
should oversee the entire process and advise the blast-
ing personnel accordingly.  This individual may be a
blasting superintendent, blasting foreman, blasting engi-
neer, or blaster-in-charge.  This person should make sure
that all relevant policies and procedures are followed,
and in case of any discrepancy that corrective action is
appropriately taken.  
This paper was presented by the authors at the ISEE’s 31st
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